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IMG-084        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1329 
 ___________ 
 
JING FENG DONG,  
A.K.A. Hai Li, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A077 997 477) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed April 5, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jing Feng Dong petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) that denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  For the 
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reasons that follow, we will grant the petition for review and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 Dong, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States in 2002 and sought 
asylum based on grounds not relevant here.  An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, 
finding that Dong was not credible.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed 
without opinion on June 23, 2004. 
On June 11, 2009, Dong filed a motion to reopen, stating that he had become a 
Christian in 2008, and that due to changed country conditions (increased persecution of 
unauthorized churches in China), he was seeking asylum.  The BIA stated that Dong‟s 
baptism and practice of Christianity in the United States reflected a change in personal 
circumstances, and held that the evidence he presented of conditions in China were “not 
sufficient to establish a change in circumstances or country conditions „arising in the 
country of nationality‟ so as to create an exception to the time and number limitation for 
filing a late motion to reopen to apply for asylum.”  Dong filed a timely petition for 
review. 
A motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of a final removal 
order.  8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(2).  However, a motion to reopen based on “changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation 
has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have 
been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” is not subject to the 90-day 
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restriction.  8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Dong argues that he meets this exception to the 
timeliness requirement.  While Dong would have no claim absent a change in his 
personal circumstances (becoming a Christian), we have recognized that an alien who has 
been ordered removed can file an untimely or successive asylum application based on 
changed personal conditions if he can also show changed country conditions in his 
motion to reopen.  Liu v. Attorney General, 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Dong submitted numerous documents in support of his motion to reopen.  Some of 
the evidence was of a more personal nature, including a letter from a friend in China, 
Zuofa Zhuang.  Zhuang described how one day in 2008, police rushed into the home of a 
Christian, Xianfeng Lin, in Huangqi town when they learned he was inside praying and 
reading the Bible.  They seized all of Lin‟s Christian materials, put Lin in jail, beat him, 
and forced him to pledge that he would “recede from the church forever.”  Zhuang further 
related that he was one of the first Christians to respond to the earthquake in Sichuan in 
2008.  When he and other Christians returned, they gathered to pray for the earthquake 
victims.  The police learned of it and arrested them.  A.R. 61.  Zhuang also told of a 
Christian who wanted to attend a Christian conference in Hong Kong.  He was 
“summoned every day by Homeland Security Bureau, United Front Work Department 
and Religious Affairs Bureau,” and made to “write a pledge and persuade other 
Christians not to attend the conference . . . .”  A.R. 62.  Dong also provided several 
documents for background information, including the State Department‟s 2008 Human 
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Rights Report for China, the State Department‟s 2008 International Religious Freedom 
Report for China, a January 2009 report from the China Aid Association, the 2008 
Annual Report of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, and several 
newspaper articles from 2007 to 2009.  Many of the documents spoke of increased 
reports of detention of congregants and other harassment of unregistered churches, 
particularly in the time leading up to the Olympics. 
The BIA provided little analysis of the information provided by Dong, stating 
only: 
 
The respondent‟s declaration that he will not attend a 
government-controlled church in China, and his evidence that a Christian 
was arrested in Huangqi Town, that earthquake assistance volunteers were 
arrested in Sichan [sic] Province, that an unnamed fellow was forced to 
persuade others not to attend a conference in Hong Kong, and that Christian 
leaders of underground churches in China have been arrested and harassed, 
are not sufficient to establish a change in circumstances or country 
conditions “arising in the country of nationality” so as to create an 
exception to the time and number limitation for filing a late motion to 
reopen to apply for asylum. 
 
A.R. 4.  The BIA‟s only statement regarding the more generalized background evidence 
is that the evidence “demonstrates that China currently allows Christian churches in the 
country.”  Id.  In Zheng v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2008), this Court 
vacated the BIA‟s denial of two motions to reopen based on changed country conditions 
in China because the BIA failed to thoroughly discuss the evidence submitted by the 
petitioners or explain why it was not sufficient.  See Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268-69, 271.  
Similarly here, the Board provided only general explanations for its conclusion that the 
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evidence Dong submitted was insufficient to support reopening.  See id. at 268 (noting 
that while the Board need not “parse or refute on the record each individual . . . piece of 
evidence offered by the petitioner,” it “should provide us with more than cursory, 
summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for declining 
to afford relief to a petitioner.”  Id. at 268 (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d 
Cir. 2006)).  Further, aside from the statement about “allowing” churches, the BIA did 
not address any of the more general background evidence that Dong submitted, even 
though he discussed the evidence in his motion to reopen. 
In its brief, the Government discusses the background evidence in the record and 
argues why it believes the evidence does not show a change in country conditions.  None 
of this rationale is present in the BIA‟s decision.  We may only review the BIA‟s decision 
based on the rationale that it provided.  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); 
Konan v. Att‟y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because the BIA‟s decision does 
not allow us to discern its reasons for denying the motion to reopen, we will grant the 
petition for review and remand for further proceedings.
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 We leave the question of whether Dong has made out a prima facie case for relief 
to the BIA to determine, if necessary, after it examines the threshold issue of whether 
Dong has showed changed country conditions.  Shardar v. Att‟y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 
(3d Cir. 2007).  
